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(Ref. NSC Action No. 866)

DATE: September 30, 1953

COPY NO. 23

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF

THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT (NSC Action No. 866)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION  
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September 30, 1953

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
on  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE  
(NSC Action 866)

1. This report is submitted in accordance with NSC Action 866 transmitted by memorandum to the Psychological Strategy Board from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council dated August 3, 1953, asking PSB to arrange for "such implementation by the responsible departments and agencies as is deemed appropriate, reporting back to the Council in sixty days on progress," with respect to all Jackson Report recommendations except Nos. 1, 20, and those in Chapter VII.

2. With the five exceptions listed below, implementation of all the recommendations is deemed appropriate by the responsible departments and agencies. Ten have been implemented already. The implementation of twenty-five more has been initiated. Thirteen others are the subject of further study by the appropriate department or agency as to how implementation can best be carried out. Further details are submitted in the appended reports from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency, and the Foreign Operations Agency.

3. The exceptions referred to in Paragraph 2, above are:

Recommendation No. 2 (VOA broadcasts to USSR): The United States Information Agency is making a detailed study of what this recommendation would mean in operational terms.

Recommendation No. 9 (Russian language programs by RIAS): The Psychological Strategy Board was enjoined to ensure that implementation of this recommendation "should not compromise the position of RIAS." Both the Department of State and United States Information Agency agree that to implement this recommendation would run the risk of compromising the position of RIAS, and accordingly the Board has decided that, instead of being carried by RIAS, Russian language programs of this type should be handled by VOA's CAST facilities at Munich.

Recommendation No. 12: Since the problem referred to is being solved in a more effective manner than that proposed in Recommendation No. 12, this recommendation is considered no longer effective. (See specially classified ANNEX E, page 1)

Recommendation No. 18: The responsible agency has in effect a number of programs for dealing with this matter, and will give all effect possible to this recommendation within budgetary and other capabilities. (See specially classified ANNEX E, page 2)

Recommendation No. 37d (Name of "Voice of America"): After giving full consideration to the question, it was concluded by all the responsible departments and agencies that the name "Voice of America" should not be changed.

1  
of 2 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

Sept. 30, 1953

4. In implementation of Recommendation No. 17 (U. S. Psychological Warfare Operations in Korea), it is anticipated that the Operations Coordinating Board may make certain positive recommendations to the National Security Council concerning over-all improvement in similar operations which may become necessary in the future.

2  
of 2 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
on  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT  
(List A)

Operations Against the Soviet System

Radio

2. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to the Soviet Union should consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented by commentary. The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a propagandist note should be avoided.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that broadcasts of the Voice of America should consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries designed to provide sober and responsible interpretations of events treated in the news and of the policies and the actions of the United States relevant to them.

3. A reduction in the number of non-Russian languages used in broadcasts to the Soviet Union appears desirable.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that no further expansion take place in the number of languages in which broadcasts to the Soviet Union are made. At the same time, it does not favor the elimination of broadcasts in Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian, Ukrainian and Georgian. It has concurred in the decision of the United States Information Agency to continue broadcasts in Armenian and to stop broadcasts in Azerbaijani, Turkestani, and Tatar.

5. Maximum guidance for VOA programming to the Soviet satellites should be provided by the American diplomatic missions in these countries.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that guidance from the United States missions in the countries concerned be provided on an increased scale for broadcasts to the satellites of Eastern Europe. At the same time, before utilization by the media, such guidance should be coordinated with guidance provided to the United States Information Agency by the Department in order to assure its conformity with the broad objectives of foreign policy.

6. VOA broadcasting facilities to Communist China should not be expanded.

Subject to the possibility that electromagnetic warfare requirements may dictate otherwise, the Department concurs in the recommendation that no expansion be undertaken in the broadcasting facilities of the Voice of America to Communist China.

7. Radio programs to Communist China should consist of factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that broadcasts to Communist China consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

1  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

by commentaries designed to provide sober and responsible interpretation of events treated in the news and of the policies and the actions of the United States relevant to them.

8. The United States should continue to operate Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS) with the present type of program.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the United States continue to operate RIAS and that it continue to broadcast without substantial modification programs of the type now being broadcast.

9. Russian language programs should be carried by RIAS addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany.

The Department does not concur in the recommendation that RIAS broadcast programs in Russian directed at the Soviet occupation forces in East Germany. It considers the recommendation to be contradictory to the recommendation that RIAS continue to broadcast without substantial modification programs of the sort now being broadcast. The Department suggests that the facilities of VOA at Munich might be examined to determine if by antenna and other plant adjustments, more attention might not be given to the Soviet occupation audience in East Germany. It should also be noted that existing facilities of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism to some extent service this audience.

Psychological Warfare Operations under Military Auspices in Korea

17. The National Security Council should initiate a study of United States psychological warfare operations in Korea, including policy with respect to prisoners of war.

If the NSC wishes to initiate such a study, the Department, in consultation with USIA, will be prepared to provide any available information.

Defector, Refugee, and Related Activities

19. The necessary legislative and organizational measures to provide adequately for the care and resettlement of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain should be taken.

The Department concurs in the response by the Foreign Operations Agency.

2  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

Propaganda and Information Activities in the Free World

General

21. The Committee believes that the primary and over-riding purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interests to take action consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States.

The Department agrees in general with the statement of purpose of the information program, although it believes that "foreign peoples" constitutes too broad and too inclusive a target, particularly for a contracting program. The Department would prefer a statement of mission indicating that the program is directed at groups and individuals capable of significantly influencing governmental actions and popular attitudes in other countries.

22. A continuing and coordinated effort should be made to inform the world clearly of the American position on major issues.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that a continuing and coordinated effort be made to inform the world clearly of the United States position on major issues. It believes that this can be carried out within the framework of other recommendations in the report.

23. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate on the conception, planning and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information activities should concentrate on the conception, planning and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations, but the expectation cannot be justified that the headquarters staffs will be wholly exempted, in the course of executing propaganda campaigns, from advising on details. This is true of the execution of military, economic and political programs. It will continue to be true of propaganda campaigns.

24. Although guidance on specific or local objectives of information activities may often be required from Washington, such guidance should generally be confined to global or regional themes. When United States policy has been explained to the field, information officials abroad should be permitted discretion in adapting it to their local situations.

The Department concurs in the recommendation when United States policy has been explained to the field, information officers should be permitted discretion in adapting it to their local situations, subject to the proviso that the Information Officer follows the foreign policy guidance of the Chief of Mission.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

3  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

25. Insofar as possible, information and propaganda material should be prepared locally to meet local needs.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that, insofar as possible, information and propaganda materials should be prepared locally to meet local needs.

26. The number of operating information personnel located in the United States, particularly within IIA, should be substantially reduced.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the number of operating information personnel located in the United States, particularly within the USIA, should be reduced, but not to the point of sacrificing essential activities. Careful consideration should be given to reassigning such personnel throughout the program to avoid dissipating hard-earned experience and unique professional skills.

27. Propaganda or information should be attributed to the United States only when such attribution is an asset. A much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that propaganda or information should be attributed to the United States only when such attribution is either requested or, in the absence of such a requirement, is an asset. The Department concurs in the view that a much greater percentage of information activity than at present should be handled without attribution in accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in the Department's instruction of November 1, 1951. At the same time, the Department points out that production and the distribution of unattributed material will require the employment of skillful and tactful personnel, not all of whom can be, in the nature of the case, indigenous personnel. The Department further points out that "Der Monat" and "Ost Probleme" published in Germany are examples of publications attribution of which to the United States may be an asset.

28. In order to be less obtrusive, there should be a substantial reduction in American personnel overseas in countries where they are heavily concentrated. They should be replaced where necessary by qualified local nationals.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that a substantial reduction should take place in United States personnel in countries where they are now heavily concentrated. The Department believes that a foreign information operation gains in effectiveness to the degree that it avoids drawing attention to itself. At the same time, reductions can be carried to a point where efficient and secure operations, as in placing unattributed materials, become difficult.

29. Far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives. The gain in dissemination and credibility through the use of such channels will more than offset the loss by the Government of some control over the content.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

4  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

The Department concurs in the recommendation that far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives. This effort will be the more productive if it is concentrated upon stimulating activities in fields in which private activity is currently limited rather than seeking to increase activity in fields in which private activity currently is fairly extensive. The need for stimulating substantially increased private activity in the exchange of cultural and artistic materials is a notable case in point. In the stimulation of activity by private organizations, care should be taken to gear such activity closely to foreign policy objectives.

30. Both international organizations and allied governments should be able to make a substantial contribution to American propaganda objectives. Increased emphasis should be placed on this form of international cooperation.

The Department concurs in the belief that international organizations and allied governments should be able to make contributions to American propaganda objectives. At the same time, the Department points out that the contribution may be less substantial than is suggested by the recommendation. Even in the case of a close ally such as the United Kingdom limitations exist with regard to degree of successful collaboration that can be achieved. These limitations are even more marked when two or more other countries are concerned.

The limitations are of the following nature:

(1) A wide disparity in capabilities for conducting foreign information activities. At the present time, only the United Kingdom among the nations of the free world has capabilities approaching those of the United States.

(2) A wide disparity in attitude toward the use of propaganda as an instrument of national policy. Many of the allies of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization regard propaganda directed against the USSR, Communist China, and the satellites of Eastern Europe as potentially, if not actually, provocative and hence undesirable.

(3) Differences in national policies which result in differences as to the treatment to be given specific matters in propaganda.

(4) Doubts as to the security of other national information agencies, which render difficult an effective exchange of policy guidance.

(5) The tendency in allied and international relationships to resolve differences at the expense of propaganda effectiveness, thereby subjecting United States output to restraints imposed from without.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

5  
of 10 pages

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SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

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Within these limitations the United States has since 1950 maintained close relations with the information services of the United Kingdom both at the capitols and at the missions in third countries. Collaboration with the United Kingdom and with France has been especially close in the Federal Republic of Germany. Less intensive but growing collaboration is being carried with Canada and with Australia. The U. S. maintains close relations with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, especially with regard to information directed at Eastern Europe.

The United States has consistently supported the work of the Information Service of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Information Service, and it has sought especially to direct its efforts to the stimulation of individual and governmental action that will make the NATO a success.

The United States has also continuously endeavored to broaden informational activities of the Organization of American States as carried out through the Pan American Union. A draft agreement for increased informational activity on the part of the members has been prepared within the Department.

In view of the peculiar difficulties surrounding the information activities of the United Nations, the United States has concluded that it can most effectively utilize its services by assuring that the position of the United States is fully presented in the deliberations of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the specialized agencies, reports of which are regularly disseminated over the facilities of the United Nations information service. The efforts of the Department in conjunction with other agencies of the government to provide the Delegation of the United States to the United Nations with effective material for use in debates contributes to this end.

31. More effective tactical control of the information and propaganda program of the various United States agencies is needed at the country level. This can best be accomplished by the Chief of Mission with the advice of a "country team" composed of the senior representatives of each agency operating information programs.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that tactical control over the information program of the country should be achieved at the country level by the Chief of Mission acting with the advice of a "country team" consisting of the senior representative of each agency operating information programs in the country. The carrying out of this recommendation should be the easier because such arrangements are already in force.

32. More coordination of all types of unattributed propaganda is necessary to prevent both waste and compromise of the covert portion. Covert propaganda should be centralized in CIA. The responsibility and authority for such coordination should be placed in the Chief of Mission.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that more effective coordination of all types of unattributed propaganda is necessary to prevent both waste and compromise of covert operations. The Department further concurs that control of covert propaganda should be centralized in

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET6  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

CIA in accordance with the terms of the agreement of November 1, 1951, with the Department providing CIA with guidance on foreign policy as it now does. It further believes that the responsibility and authority for such coordination abroad should be placed in the Chief of Mission.

33. An effective foreign information program can only be achieved if it receives firm support to ensure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations and flexibility in management. The Committee recommends that firm executive and Congressional support be extended, in order to stabilize the organization and size of the information programs. Regulations should be amended where possible to permit greater flexibility in the allocation of funds and personnel.

The Department concurs in the statement that an effective foreign information program can only be achieved if it receives firm support to assure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations and a flexibility in management. This will require a consistent program of public and Congressional relations participated in by the Executive Branch at all levels and through all appropriate spokesmen.

34. Appropriations for the information program should not be drastically reduced until the new procedures recommended have been tried.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that appropriations for the information program should not be further drastically reduced until new procedures now being enforced have been subject to thorough trial.

35. Public understanding and support of the program is vital. The Committee supports the recommendation made by the United States Advisory Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning its program.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the USIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning its program, as well as that officers of the USIA and of other appropriate agencies be permitted to speak to audiences in various parts of the country with regard to the work of the program.

36. Consideration should be given to reducing, where possible, the adverse propaganda effects of certain security and immigration regulations.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that consideration be given to reducing where possible, the adverse propaganda effects of certain security and immigration regulations. The Department believes that considerable progress in this direction can be made through appropriate action on the part of the Operations Coordinating Board.

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

7  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

Media Recommendations

37. (a) Short-wave radio programs to the free world should be continued only to those areas where the Chief of Mission expresses a desire for retention or where the broadcasts are required for purposes of electromagnetic warfare.

The Department concurs in the recommendations that short-wave radio programs to the free world should be continued only to the areas where the Chief of Mission expresses a desire for retention or where the broadcasts are required for the purposes of electromagnetic warfare, subject to the following revisions:

- (1) The short-wave program requirements for electromagnetic warfare should be established before the judgments of the Chiefs of Mission are sought as to other aspects of short-wave broadcasting to foreign countries.
- (2) That the recommendations of the Chief of Mission be reviewed in the Department for political considerations of a regional or global nature of which the Chief of Mission may not be fully aware.

37. (b) Broadcasts attributed to the United States Government should concentrate on objective factual news reporting. Selection and treatment of news should seek to present a full exposition of United States actions and policies.

The Department concurs in the recommendations that broadcasts attributed to the U. S. Government should concentrate on objective factual news reporting and that the selection or treatment of news should seek to present a full exposition of U. S. actions and policies. At the same time the Department understands that concentration upon objective factual news reporting does not exclude appropriate commentary in explanation of U.S. actions and policies.

37. (c) Radio should be used for exhortation in the free world only on a non-attributed basis. In order to lessen attribution and to reach the largest audience, maximum use should be made of local broadcasting facilities.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that radio should be used for exhortation in the free world only on an unattributed basis and that maximum use should be made of local broadcasting facilities.

37. (d) Consideration should be given to changing the name "Voice of America."

The Department does not see the necessity for the recommendation that the name "Voice of America" should be changed. The name "Voice of America" has over a decade won wide acceptance in all parts of the world, the choice of a new name would be difficult and perhaps confusing to foreign listeners and the controversy that has lately surrounded the Voice of America has not been of a sort to permanently discredit or to devalue it.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

8  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

38. (a) Exchange of persons, particularly students, for long term cultural purposes is worthwhile and should be continued.

The Department concurs that the exchange of persons, particularly of students, for long term cultural purposes is worthwhile and should be continued in adequate numbers as an integral part of a balanced national propaganda program.

38. (b) More use should be made of the medium of exchange of persons in influencing the attitude of important local individuals.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that more use should be made of the medium of exchange of persons in influencing the attitude of important local individuals. In this connection importance attaches to assuring that exchanges are entitled to per diem expenses commensurate with their dignity and their importance. Furthermore, the point is noted that the good effects of the exchange of leaders are sometimes weakened by the official character of the exchange. Consideration might be given to the possibility of exchange programs conducted in such a way as to make possible the visits of important individuals to the U.S. under strictly unofficial auspices.

39. Publications can be used to much better advantage. IIA should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever possible so that material will be more responsive to local needs. The programs of all agencies should be reviewed.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the program of publications be reviewed with the view to decentralization to the maximum possible extent so that material be more responsive to local needs. The Department points out in this connection that local production may sometimes be more expensive than mass production in the United States or at a regional production center.

40. (a) Wherever possible, government films should be unattributed and produced by local industry. Films should be more suited to audiences.

The Department concurs that any films program should, wherever possible, be unattributed, tailored to local needs and produced by local industry. The Department observes in this connection that such production may be more expensive than production in the United States.

40. (b) Greater efforts should be made to influence commercial film production in order to increase its contribution to the national information program.

The Department concurs that greater efforts should be made to inform producers of commercial films of U. S. national objectives in order that such producers may be able to increase the contribution of their films to the national information program.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

9  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

41. (a) The information Centers fill a cultural need and should be continued.

The Department concurs in the observation that the information Centers fill a cultural need and should be continued.

41. (b) The Government should cooperate with the commercial publishing industry and subsidize its efforts when necessary to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free world.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the Government cooperate with the commercial publishing industry and subsidize its efforts when necessary to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free world.

41. (c) While the Government must not aid in the distribution of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the Government, while not assisting in the distribution of subversive books, should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution of books which may contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life where such distribution is considered to be useful in advancing the achievement of United States objectives abroad.

42. The United States should be in a position to provide advice and assistance to foreign television industries in their formative stages. Unattributed programs of American origin could be carried on local stations.

The Department concurs in the recommendation that the United States should put itself in position to provide advice and assistance to foreign television industries in their formative stages. It further concurs in the recommendation that unattributed programs of American origin be carried on local stations.

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

10  
of 10 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

ANNEX B

REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY  
on  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT  
(List A)

Operations Against the Soviet System

Radio

2. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to the Soviet Union should consist of objective, factual news reporting supplemented by commentary. The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a propagandist note should be avoided.

The U. S. Information Agency is making a detailed study of what this recommendation would mean in operational terms.

3. A reduction in the number of non-Russian languages used in broadcasts to the Soviet Union appears desirable.

Reduction of non-Russian languages in broadcasts to the USSR is currently taking place. Azerbaijani, Turkestan and Tatar services are being terminated. The Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian and the three Baltic Services are being continued.

5. Maximum guidance for VOA programming to the Soviet satellites should be provided by the American diplomatic missions in these countries.

A circular instruction (as well as an informal-personal letter setting forth in detail the reasons why recommendations on the handling, particularly of fast-breaking news developments is required) has been sent to our missions in the Soviet-satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

6. VOA broadcasting facilities to Communist China should not be expanded.

Agree. No further expansion will be made of our facilities for broadcasting to Communist China. In accordance with a PSB decision we will study the possibility of additional programming over existing facilities.

7. Radio programs to Communist China should consist of factual news reporting supplemented by commentaries.

We agree that the major proportion of our broadcasts to Communist China should comprise news and commentaries, but this should not exclude other effective techniques which are useful for this audience.

The Committee recommendation appears to be based upon the fact that the limited audience in Communist China is composed almost entirely of Communist Party and government officials. While we do not know definitely, we believe it is safe to assume that there also is a clandestine listening audience, many of whom are thoroughly out of sympathy with the communist rulers.

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

1  
of 6 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

ANNEX B

8. The United States should continue to operate Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS) with the present type of program.

Agree.

9. Russian language programs should be carried by RIAS addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany.

We do not believe it advisable, at this time, to initiate over RIAS facilities, Russian language programs addressed to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany. When this question was raised, shortly after the June 17 demonstrations, Ambassador Conant interposed objections on the grounds that East Germans have come to accept RIAS as a joint German-American radio station and that the effectiveness of RIAS would suffer if programming of this nature were initiated.

We propose to undertake Russian language programs to Soviet occupation troops in East Germany over CAST facilities. CAST is now relaying Munich Relay Center Russian language programs. These programs can be designed primarily for Soviet occupation forces.

Propaganda and Information Activities in the Free World

General

21. The Committee believes that the primary and over-riding purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interests to take action consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States.

We are in complete agreement with this recommendation. The forthcoming instruction on the 1954 program will include this conception.

22. A continuing and coordinated effort should be made to inform the world clearly of the American position on major issues.

Agree.

23. The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate on the conception, planning and coordination of global propaganda campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations.

We agree with this recommendation and believe it will be accomplished in the organization of the new agency which will put full responsibility on the field for the execution of its own programs.

24. Although guidance on specific or local objectives of information activities may often be required from Washington, such guidance should generally be confined to global or regional themes. When United

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

2  
of 6 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX B

States policy has been explained to the field, information officials abroad should be permitted discretion in adapting it to their local situations.

Agree. Occasionally, however, foreign policy decisions necessitate a very specific guidance which defines what can and cannot be said on a given subject.

25. Insofar as possible, information and propaganda material should be prepared locally to meet local needs.

It is our intention to produce an increasingly large amount of our materials locally or at regional production centers at the direction of the PAO.

26. The number of operating information personnel located in the United States, particularly within IIA, should be substantially reduced.

Personnel in the United States has been substantially reduced.

27. A much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed.

We agree that unattributed materials and activities are among the most effective means of getting our point of view across.

28. In order to be less obtrusive, there should be a substantial reduction in American personnel overseas in countries where they are heavily concentrated. They should be replaced where necessary by qualified local nationals.

There has been a substantial reduction in American personnel overseas. We agree that qualified locals should be used and are giving flexibility to PAO in hiring qualified locals.

29. Far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives. The gain in dissemination and credibility through the use of such channels will more than offset the loss by the Government of some control over the content.

The need of increasing this type of activity is recognized by doubling the budget of the private enterprise cooperation staff at a time when the entire Agency is undergoing drastic reductions. Particular stress will be put on the development of local cooperation from private American enterprise, foundations, etc., in individual countries overseas.

31. More effective tactical control of the information and propaganda program of the various United States agencies is needed at the country level. This can best be accomplished by the Chief of Mission with the advice of a "country team" composed of the senior representatives of each agency operating information programs.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

of 6 <sup>3</sup> pages




SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX B

We believe that the country team concept and a unified country program will be a result of the establishment of the U. S. Information Agency. The information activities of MSA and TCA have been transferred to the new agency and a consolidated field program will be directed by the U. S. Information Service country director working closely with the Ambassador.

32. More coordination of all types of unattributed propaganda is necessary to prevent both waste and compromise of the covert portion.



USIA does not engage in covert operations. The type of unattributed materials and activities usually carried on by USIA are governed by the inter-agency agreement of November 1951 "USIE and indigenous operations."

33. An effective foreign information program can only be achieved if it receives firm support to ensure permanency of organization, consistency in appropriations and flexibility in management. The Committee recommends that firm executive and congressional support be extended, in order to stabilize the organization and size of the information programs. Regulations should be amended where possible to permit greater flexibility in the allocation of funds and personnel.

Agree.

34. Appropriations for the information program should not be drastically reduced until the new procedures recommended have been tried.

Agree.

35. Public understanding and support of the program is vital. The Committee supports the recommendation made by the United States Advisory Commission on Information in its Seventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress, January 1953, that IIA be authorized to release domestically, without request, information concerning its program.

We agree that the need to inform the American public is vital to the success of this program.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

of 6 <sup>4</sup>/<sub>4</sub> pages

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

ANNEX B

Media Recommendations

37. (a) Short-wave radio programs to the free world should be continued only to those areas where the Chief of Mission expresses a desire for retention or where the broadcasts are required for purposes of electromagnetic warfare.

We agree to the extent that our budget permits us to accept the recommendations of the Chiefs of Mission. In addition to the recommendations of the Missions, and electromagnetic considerations, there are certain other factors to be taken into account in maintaining or cancelling short-wave programs. For example, the desirability of maintaining, at least at a minimum level, a world-wide news program in English, and the desirability of maintaining shortwave transmissions where facilities are available to use to relay these programs over long or medium wave.

37. (b) Broadcasts attributed to the United States Government should concentrate on objective factual news reporting. Selection and treatment of news should seek to present a full exposition of United States actions and policies.

Agree.

37. (c) Radio should be used for exhortation in the free world only on a non-attributed basis. In order to lessen attribution and to reach the largest audience, maximum use should be made of local broadcasting facilities.

We agree that maximum use should be made of local broadcasting facilities providing that we are able to place material which contributes to our objectives. Frequently the limitations on the content which may be included in local programs are so severe that material placed does not achieve anything except possibly good will.

37. (d) Consideration should be given to changing the name "Voice of America."

We do not believe the name Voice of America should be changed. The VOA is an established name throughout the world and to change it would mean rebuilding an audience acceptance.

39. Publications can be used to much better advantage. IIA should carefully review its program and decentralize wherever possible so that material will be more responsive to local needs.

As stated in connection with the recommendation on local production, publications will also be produced in the field missions or in the regional production centers at the direction of the Public Affairs Officer.

SECURITY INFORMATION  
TOP SECRET

5  
of 6 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX B

40. (a) Wherever possible, government films should be unattributed and produced by local industry. Films should be more suited to audiences.

We agree with this recommendation. During the past two years the number of indigenously produced films, particularly in France, Italy, the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand has been increased. Films produced in this manner are also distributed without attribution.

40. (b) Greater efforts should be made to influence commercial film production in order to increase its contribution to a national information program.

We agree.

41. (a) The information centers fill a cultural need and should be continued.

We agree. In the Fiscal 54 budget reductions, information centers were cut the least of all media. Only ten of the 143 centers were cut. Of the ten cut, five are in Japan, leaving nineteen.

41. (b) The Government should cooperate with the commercial publishing industry and subsidize its efforts when necessary to combat the flood of inexpensive communist books in the free world.

We agree. This problem has been met in part by the establishment of Franklin Publications, a corporation subsidized from U. S. Information Agency appropriations. We intend to continue this operation to the extent that appropriations permit. Franklin Publications can do much to make available in foreign markets through indigenous publishing channels, good American books in the native language at prices which can successfully compete with inexpensive communist-produced materials.

41. (c) While the Government must not aid in the distribution of subversive books, it should not hesitate to facilitate the distribution of books which contain justified criticism of one phase or another of American life.

We agree.

42. The United States should be in a position to provide advice and assistance to foreign television industries in their formative stages. Unattributed programs of American origin could be carried on local stations.

We agree. The U. S. Information Agency at present provides a weekly ten-minute newsreel without attribution to the U. S. to 14 missions for use on local television.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

6  
of 6 pages

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

ANNEX C

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
on  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT  
(List A)

Psychological Warfare Operations under Military Auspices in Korea

17. The National Security Council should initiate a study of United States psychological warfare operations in Korea, including policy with respect to prisoners of war.

The Department of Defense has submitted a preliminary report on its activities in this field, and if the National Security Council wishes to initiate a coordinated study of the subject, will be prepared to provide any available information.

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

1  
of 1 page

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

ANNEX D

REPORT OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION  
on  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT  
(List A)

Operations Against the Soviet System

Defector, Refugee, and Related Activities

19. The necessary legislative and organizational measures to provide adequately for the care and resettlement of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain should be taken.

On December 20, 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board approved PSB D-18a, which provided policy and authority for a program "insuring or arranging the employment, resettlement or care of all escapees from the Soviet Orbit..." The Department of State was assigned administrative responsibility. Legislative authority was provided under Section 101(a)1 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and funds were made available for operation of the program by Presidential directive on March 22, 1952, authorizing the transfer from MSA to the Department of State. The Program has been fully operational since May 1952, after the establishment of Escapee Program missions in all of the major countries of reception, including Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Trieste. By June 30, 1953, over 22,500 escapees had been registered and assisted through care, maintenance and resettlement activities under the Escapee Program. Of these, over 5,000 have been resettled in either the United States, Canada, Australia, or Latin America. By action of the PSB, the Program for Fiscal 1954 was expanded to include certain Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, Yugoslav escapees, Kazakh and Turki escapees in the Near East, and Greek refugees-escapees from Albania and Rumania. The Program budget authorized for Fiscal Year 1954 is \$9 million. In accordance with the reorganization of all foreign operations, the Escapee Program was transferred on July 1, 1953 from the Department of State to the Foreign Operations Administration.

Since the inception of the Program, considerable progress has been made in all phases, but particularly in the care and maintenance aspects of the Program. Outstanding results have been achieved in Austria, Italy and Turkey. In view of the magnitude of the problem, progress in the program in Germany has come somewhat slower than in other countries. Within the scope of existing policy, organizational measures are adequate to provide for the care and resettlement of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. From the psychological standpoint, existing legislation is not adequate for the resettlement of some escapees because, generally speaking, former members of the Communist Party or the Communist apparatus are not permitted entrance into the United States. From an operational point of view, the Refugee Relief Act legislation is inadequate because it does not now provide for the financing of ocean transport for refugees eligible under the Act.

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

of 1<sup>1</sup> page

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Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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